Legal Corner: Seven Significant Supreme Court Cases for Local Governments

Christina Estes-Werther, League General Counsel

Significant Supreme Court Cases for Local Governments
Adapted from Lisa Soronen, State and Local Legal Center (SLLC), Washington, D.C.


This past term the United States Supreme Court issued a myriad of decisions that significantly impact local governments. The State and Local Legal Center summarized several of these cases, which have been adapted to specifically address items of interest for Arizona cities and towns.

Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S.Ct. 2218 - Content-Based Sign Codes Unconstitutional

supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-502_9olb.pdf

The Town of Gilbert, Arizona adopted a Sign Code that requires a permit for the display of outdoor signs, except for those signs that fall under one of the exempted categories. Good News Community Church ("church") and Pastor Clyde Reed filed a complaint alleging that Gilbert was abridging their freedom of speech by categorizing their signs as "temporary directional signs" and citing the church for failure to meet certain criteria required for this exempted category.

The U.S. Supreme Court held unanimously that Gilbert's sign code was a content-based law that violates the First Amendment because Gilbert used the content of the sign to determine whether the sign was temporary directional, ideological or political, among other categories. Essentially, the court found that the church's sign was regulated according to the message it was conveying.

Content-based laws are only constitutional if they pass strict scrutiny, which means the law must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. While the SLLC argued in its amicus brief that Gilbert's sign categories are based on function, the court concluded they are based on content and failed strict scrutiny because Gilbert's two asserted compelling interests-preserving aesthetic and traffic safety-were "hopelessly underinclusive." Gilbert's sign code allowed unlimited display of larger Ideological Signs and was unable to demonstrate that temporary directional signs posed a greater threat to safety than any other signs.

Many, if not most communities, like Gilbert, regulate some categories of signs in a way the Supreme Court has defined as content-based and cities and towns will need to review their ordinances for compliance.

City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S.Ct. 2443 - Hotel Registry Searches Need Subpoenas

supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-1175_2qe4.pdf

The court held 5-4 that a Los Angeles ordinance requiring hotel and motel operators to make their guest registries available for police inspection without a subpoena violates the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable search and seizures.

The city argued that the purpose of hotel registry ordinances is to deter crime-drug dealing, prostitution, and human trafficking-on the theory that criminals will not commit crimes in hotels if they have to provide identifying information.

According to the court, searches permitted by the city's ordinance are done to ensure compliance with recordkeeping requirements. As an exception to the warrant requirement, administrative searches require "precompliance review before a neutral decisionmaker." The court examined whether this type of search of a hotel registry fell within the administrative search exception and found that the hotel owner did not have an opportunity to appear before a neutral decisionmaker when an officer demanded the records and the penalty for failing to comply with the demand was a misdemeanor. The court held that absent at least a subpoena, "the ordinance creates an intolerable risk that searches authorized by it will exceed statutory limits, or be used as a pretext to harass hotel operators and their guests."

In dissent, Justice Scalia stated that the "limited inspection" by the police was reasonable and based on the circumstances and cited the SLLC's amicus brief, which notes that local governments in at least 41 states have adopted similar ordinances. Eight states also have hotel registry statutes: Indiana, Florida, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia.

It is likely following this decision that other record inspections done by governments outside the hotel registry context will also require subpoenas.

Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. inclusive Communities Project, 135 S.Ct. 2507 - Fair Housing Act Disparate Impact Claims Recognized

supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-1371_m64o.pdf

The court held 5-4 that disparate-impact claims, which alleges a disproportionate adverse impact on a particular group, may be brought under the Fair Housing Act (FHA).

The Inclusive Communities Project claimed the Texas housing department's selection criteria for federal low-income tax credits in Dallas had a disparate impact on minorities because it resulted in segregated housing. The holding is consistent with prior cases by the court that disparate-impact claims are possible under Title VII (prohibiting race, discrimination in employment, etc.) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which use similar language as the FHA.

This decision continues the status quo for local governments. Nine federal circuit courts of appeals had previously reached the same conclusion. But, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion contains a number of limits on the process of bringing forward disparate impact housing claims.

T-Mobile South v. City of Roswell, 135 S.Ct. 808 - Reasons for Cell Tower Denials Must Be in Writing

supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-975_8n6a.pdf

The court held 6-3 that the Telecommunications Act (TCA) requires local governments to provide reasons when denying an application to build a cell phone tower, at the time the denial is issued.

The TCA requires that a local government's decision denying a cell tower construction permit be "in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record" since the wireless provider has only 30 days to sue following the denial of an application. Here, the court found that Roswell's City Council denied the T-Mobile South application in the hearing and sent a letter two days later, but failed to state the reasons for denial in the letter. Additionally, the city council's minutes were not published for 26 days after the meeting.

The court held that the reasons must be given in writing - the reasons do not have to be stated in the denial letter but must be articulated "with sufficient clarity in some other written record issued essentially contemporaneously with the denial," which can include council meeting minutes. The written denial allows a court to determine whether the denial was supported by substantial evidence.

Following this decision, local governments should not issue any written denial of a wireless siting application until they (1) set forth the reasons for the denial in that written decision, or (2) make available to the wireless provider the final council meeting minutes or transcript of the meeting.

Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609 - No Dog Sniffs after Traffic Stops

supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-9972_p8k0.pdf

In a 6-3 decision the court held that a dog sniff conducted after a completed traffic stop violates the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable search and seizure.

After the officer issued a written warning to Rodriguez and concluded his work relating to a highway stop, he detained Rodriguez until a second officer arrived and a dog sniff could be conducted around the vehicle, which resulted in the discovery of drugs in the vehicle.

The court held that officers may lengthen stops to make sure vehicles are operating safely or for an officer's safety but a dog sniff is aimed at discovering illegal drugs and does not relate to officer or highway safety. This case is distinguished from Illinois v. Caballes, which upheld a suspicionless dog search conducted during a lawful traffic stop stating that a seizure for a traffic stop "become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission" of issuing a ticket for the violation.

In dissent, Justice Alito suggests savvy police officers can skirt the Court's ruling by learning "the prescribed sequence of events even if they cannot fathom the reason for that requirement."

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466 - Objectively Unreasonable is the Standard for Pretrial Detainee Excessive Force Claims

supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-6368_m6hn.pdf

The court held 5-4 that to prove an excessive force claim a pretrial detainee must show that the officer's force was objectively unreasonable, rejecting the subjectively unreasonable standard that is more deferential to law enforcement.

Pretrial detainee Michael Kingsley claimed officers used excessive force in transferring him between jail cells to remove a piece of paper covering a light fixture that Kingsley refused to remove. Excessive force means "force applied recklessly that is unreasonable in light of the facts and circumstances of the time."

The court held that an objective standard must be used for pretrial detainees when examining whether force is excessive and Kingsley "must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively reasonable" and does not have to demonstrate the defendant's state of mind as required in a subjective standard.

The objective standard applies to those who, like Kingsley, have been accused but not convicted of a crime, but who unlike Kingsley are free on bail. A standard more deferential to law enforcement applies to post-conviction detainees, who are housed with pretrial detainees, making this ruling difficult for jails to comply with. Following this decision it will be easier for pretrial detainees to bring successful excessive force claims against corrections officers.

Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl, 135 S.Ct. 1124 - Tax on Internet Purchases

supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-1032_8759.pdf

Colorado requires retailers who do not collect a sales or use tax to 1) notify their customers that the State requires the customer to report certain tax information and 2) to report tax-related information to the customer and the Colorado Department of Revenue. The Direct Marketing Association sued Colorado in federal court claiming that the notice and reporting requirements are unconstitutional. The primary issue addressed by the court was whether the Tax Injunction Act (TIA) allowed the case to be heard in federal court. The court held that the suit is not barred by the TIA and reversed and remanded the case for further review.

Of interest to local governments is the concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy. He stated that the "legal system should find an appropriate case for this court to reexamine Quill," which was a 1992 case that held that states cannot require retailers with no in-state physical presence to collect use tax (Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 112 S.Ct. 1904, (1992)). Justice Kennedy stated that there have been significant developments in how business is conducted through online retailers who have no physical presence in the state and "there is a powerful case to be made that a retailer doing extensive business within a State has a sufficiently 'substantial nexus' to justify some minor tax-collection duty, even if that business is done through mail or internet."

This case is significant for local governments because of the skepticism expressed about whether Quill should remain the law of the land.

Conclusion

While these cases have varying impact on Arizona municipalities, this Supreme Court term will require many, if not most, local governments to make some changes to remain in compliance with the law. Consult with your city or town attorney or contact the League for any questions relating to these cases. Visit the State and Local Legal Center (statelocallc.org) for a link to their amicus briefs and information about the cases highlighted in this article.
 

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